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Cases and Other Authorities on Equity. Volumv 3. Reformation, Rcs-
cission, and Restitution, at Law (Quasi-Contracts) and in Equity. By
Walter Wheeler Cook. St. Paul, West Publishing Company, 1924. Pp.
xx. 1048.
Ever since the introduction of Quasi-Contracts in the law school curricu-
lum, it has been treated, in nearly all of the schools, as a subject quite
distinct from Equity. That quasi-contractual obligations are, in a broad
sense, equitable in character, was recognized from the first. But the fact
that they are enforceable at law through the fiction of a promise, coupled
with the fact that restitution in equity was already covered by Ames'
Cases in Equity Jurisdiction, led to separate treatment. Professor Cool:,
while engaged in teaching both Equity and Quasi-Contract, conceived
the idea of combining the latter subject with Recission and Reformation
in Equity. The experiment seemed to him a distinct success, and the
present volume is the outcome.
The book is divided into five parts: Part I, Mistake (Including Nis-
representation and Non-Disclosure); Part II, Benefits conferred under
Agreements which have been wholly or partly performed; Part III, Bene-
fits conferred under Compulsion and Undue Influence; Part IV, Benefits
conferred under Intervention in Another's Affairs; Part V, Benefits ob-
tained by the Wrongful Use of Another's Property.
In the selection and arrangement of the cases in Part I, which consti-
tutes more than half of the volume, the editor doubtless found his most
difficult task. For it is here that the courts of law and of equity have
most frequently dealt with essentially the same problems. But diffieul-
ties are anything but obstacles to Professor Cook, and it is precisely in
this part that he has probably done his best work. The cases are w:ell
chosen, and the arrangement is as effective, from the pedagogical stand-
point, as the nature of the subject permits. The student is likely to he
confused at times by the mixture of cases at law and in equity, but if he
is clearheaded and persistent he will emerge with a pretty thorough un-
derstanding of the principles of relief from mistake. And he will have had
an impressive demonstration of the true relation between law and equity.
The remaining parts of the book deal with situations in which relief in
equity is less frequent, and consequently show less originality. Whether
the editor has here substantially improved upon preceding casebools in
Quasi-Contracts is a question upon which there will be a difference of
opinion. At any rate he has provided entirely adequate material.
Although it happens that the present reviewer has been more interested
in the legal than in the equitable aspect of "unjust enrichment," the use
of this casebook has convinced him that much is gained by treating both
aspects together. For one thing, time can be saved-though this cannot
be accomplished without a judicious trimming of the super-abundant ma-
terial in Professor Cook's volume. What is more important, by a com-
parison of the cases of equitable rescission and reformation with those of
relief through the medium of an action at law, both the essential simi-
larities and the incidental differences may be strikingly brought out. It
is believed that every teacher, whether of Quasi-Contracts or of Equity,
will do well to try the experiment of teaching them together.
It is always easy, in reviewing a casebook, to make minor criticisms of
[119]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the editor's selection of cases. In the present volume teachers will miss
some of their old favorites. For a conspicuous example, they will find
Moses v. Macferlan reduced to a brief note near the end of the volume,
dealing with the overhauling of a judgment, without any quotation of
Lord Mansfield's famous dictum on the nature and scope of the action of
assumpsit. But, on the other hand, there are many interesting and signifi-
cant cases not to be found in other casebooks; and there can be no doubt
that, on the whole, the collection is a most useful and stimulating instru-




Reports of Cases in the Vice-Admiralty of the Province of New York and
in the Court of Admiralty of the State of New York, 1715-1788. Edited
by Charles Merrill Hough, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1925. pp.
xxxvi, 311.
It is well known that when the Federal Admiralty courts were first or-
ganized under the Constitution, they considered that the constitutional
grant of "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" was intended
to vest them simply with the Admiralty jurisdiction administered by the
courts of the mother country at the time. Hence they declined jurisdiction
over cases not arising on tide water.1
But the growth of commerce on our great rivers resulted in further
consideration of the question and repudiation of the limitations on the
admiralty jurisdiction in England which had been imposed by writs of
prohibition from the courts of law. In Waring v. Clarke2 the Supreme
Court decided that the American admiralty jurisdiction extended over
tidal waters within the body of a county, thus ignoring one restriction of
the English courts. Five years thereafter, in The Genesee Chief v. Fitz-
hugh,3 the tidal test also was discarded and the test of navigability an-
nounced as the criterion.
This conclusion was reached by studying more closely the jurisdiction
exercised by the colonial courts of admiralty and the commissions under
which many of them had acted. This resulted in the decision that the
jurisdiction had in mind by the framers of the Constitution was that
exercised by the colonial and state admiralty courts, with which they were
familiar, and not the narrower jurisdiction of the English courts, with
which they were not familiar.
On this account any records of those early American courts which can
be exhumed and made accessible to the practitioner are of value, and even
Judge Hough's enthusiasm for his find has not exaggerated its importance.
New York seems to have been more fortunate than the other colonies--
perhaps from the fact that it fell into British hands so early in the Revo-
lution and remained under their control so long so that its records escaped
the vicissitudes of war. Judge Hough in the Appendix relates the fate of
the other colonial records.
As to Boston, the writer a few years ago had the good fortune to find
in an old book store the brief of Henry Wheaton and Daniel Webster in
Peele v. Merchants Insurance Co.4 in the U. S. Supreme Court. It was
an admiralty suit upon a marine insurance policy, tried before Mr. Justice'
1 The Thomas Jefferson, (1825, U. S.) 10 Wheat. 428.
2 (1847, U. S.) 5 How. 441.
3 (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 443.
4 (1822, C. C. D. Mass.) Fed. Cas. No. 10905.
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Story in Massachusetts. The question of jurisdiction was made and re-
served but not discussed in the opinion, as Judge Story had already
decided in favor of the jurisdiction in the famous caze of DeLovio v. Boit.0
The case was tried and decided on the merits, and was taken to the
Supreme Court, whose minutes show; "Reversed by consent Jan. 31, 1827
without prejudice to any party or any question and without costs."
The brief-as would be expected of its authors-is a strong one, but is
chiefly notable for its appendix. It extracts from Godolphin, The Sea
Laws, the argument of Sir Leoline Jenkins in the House of Lords on the
admiralty jurisdiction, and quotes Malyne's Lecx Mcrcatoria, Zouch and
Exton-everything which bears on the admiralty jurisdiction in contract.
It also contains an abstract of all the records of the Admiralty Court of
Boston from 1740 to 1747, accompanied by the statement that "there are
no other Admiralty Records in Massachusetts prior to the adoption of the
Constitution."
In Virginia we are still more unfortunate. As early as 1660 the House
of Burgesses passed an act constituting the Governor and Council a court
of admiralty,6 but no court was organized till 1697. In 1671 Governor
Berkeley, in answer to "Enquiries by the lords commissioners of foreign
plantations" says (as to "what courts of judicature are within your gov-
ernment relating to the admiralty") that in 28 years there has never been
one prize brought into the country; so that there is no need for a particu-
lar court for that concern. 7 In the same paper, however, he says that
"English ships, near 80 come out of England and Ireland every year for
tobacco; few New England ketches," 8 which indicates a fairly active
trade.
But later-in 1715--Governor Spotswood, in answering a query from
the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, states that the Vir-
ginia Vice-Admiralty Court is composed of "Judges who are Gentlemen of
English birth, and bred up at the Inns of Chancery in the profession of
the Law." 9
The Virginia Convention of 1775-6 first elected Edmund Randolph, John
Blair and James Holt, and afterwards James Hubard, Joseph Prentis and
John Tyler judges of the admiralty court; and the state court of admiralty
was in active operation down to the adoption of The Constitution.
In colonial times John Clayton, John Holloway and Edward Barradall
served on the admiralty court at different times. They had all filled the
office of Attorney General, and were men of high attainments. It is
almost certain" that they wrote opinions, and yet not one can be located.
A room in the capitol at Williamsburg was assigned to this court, and its
records must have been lost, either in the hurried removal of the capital
to Richmond in 1779, or more probably when the capitol was burned at
the evacuation of Richmond in 1865. And so the New Yorh records are
like the surviving Sibylline books, more valuable from the loss of their
companions.
The subjects of maritime jurisdiction with which we of the present
time are familiar are rather scarce. Collision cases, as might be expected,
are absent, and there are only a few salvage cases. They did not object to
selling slaves at that time in New York.1 They declined cognizance of
seizure within the body of a county, or contracts made on land," thus
5 (1815, C. C. D. Mass.) Fed. Cas. No. 3776.
1 1 Hen. Sts. 537.
7 2 Hen. Sts. 512.
8 Ibid. 515.
9 Spotswood Letters, vol. 2, p. 193.
20 Ex parte 17 Indians, Molattos and Negroes, p. 29; EX partc JoIzn
Reton, p. 31; Cox agt. Two Negroc Men, p. 73.
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following the narrower restrictions of the English courts. A good example
of a nolo contendere plea is given.12 A libel for an assault supor altum
mare consisting of throwing punch in one's face is sustained, and damages
assessed at 20 shillings. 13 So also an assault on a passenger by the master
of a ship.14 In a case where the master sued in a representative character
and died during the pendency of the suit, the proceeding was revived in the
name of the owners.'5 In an unreported case known to the writer suit
was revived in the name of the master's personal representative-an
obvious error as the master was suing as agent and an agency is revoked
by death. In Francis v. The Ann, p. 63 (a libel for seamen's wages) the
res was taken into custody under the process of the court, although it was
theA in the custody of a court of law. Such an interference of one court
with another would not be permitted now.'( In The New York (p. 217-9)
the judge at the request of proctor for claimants answered interrogatories
in writing, but not under oath, as there was no one to swear him, and the
same were read at the hearing. The report does not show whether the
other side was permitted to file cross-interrogatories or to cross-examine.
But this attempt to act as judge and witness did not meet the approval
of the court when an appeal was taken to England, and his answers to
the interrogatories were thrown out as unsworn to.
Prize cases and cases arising out of the English navigation laws and
trade regulations are much more numerous than any of the other classes.
The proximity of New York and New England to the sea line of communi-
cation between France and Canada, as compared to the Southern colonie3
would largely account for the prize cases. As to the trade cases, some
irreverent historians have insinuated that smuggling was regarded as
quite a gentlemanly occupation in the Northern colonies. It may have
been so in the Southern ones too, but, unless our lost records rise up to
testify against us, they cannot prove it against us.
Judge Hough's annotations and preliminary discussion show excellent
judgment, being just enough to bring out the original matter in its best
phase, and not so elaborate as to relegate it to a secondary place.
ROBERT M. HUGHES
Norfolk, Virginia.
The Historical Foundation of the Law Relating to Trade Marks. By,
Frank I. Schechter. New York, Columbia University Press, 1925, pp.
xxviii, 211.
This book marks the beginning of research work in the various law
schools in this country. Although such work is in its infancy, its growth
is assured. It is fitting that the first book of the Columbia Legal Series
should be devoted to the law of trade marks, which has become so im-
portant under present day business practice.
Mr. Schechter's work is interesting and thorough. It is of practical
advantage in providing a background for a subject of which the average
lawyer, as well as the layman, is likely to be ignorant. The historical
development of a trade mark, from a liability to an asset of tremendous
value, throws considerable light upon the difficulties encountered today in
trade mark litigation.
"'Kennedy agt. 32 bbls. gunpowder, p. 82.
12 King v. Booth, p. 12.
Is Thomas v. Bryson, p. 179.
14 Gillaspie v. Hynes, p. 210.
"5 Rainbow, p. 63.
16 Taylor v. Carryl, (1857, U. S.) 20 How. 583; Moran v. Sturges (1894
154 U. S. 256, 14 Sup. Ct. 1019.
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With the breaking down of the Guilds and the extension to other fields
of business, which previously had been local, trade marks came to be re-
garded as assets and relief was sought against counterfeiting. This was
originally cared for by the Guilds themselves. The growth of the common
law conception of a trade mark from the fragmentary Guild trade mark
law, coupled with the relief afforded in the Privy Council and Star Cham-
ber, and the final intervention of equity to prevent commercial fraud,
marked the milestones of progress. Yet the English Courts found con-
siderable difficulty in granting relief. Although strongly inclined to pre-
vent fraud, it was necessary for them to find a legal basis. In the early
English cases various grounds were stated, deceit of the public, interfer-
ence with property rights, etc. No particular principle has as yet been
agreed upon. Some courts, even now, speak of a property right in the
trade mark, others of deceit of the public, and still others of interference
with the good will of a particular trader. The difficulty with the prezent
law of trade marks, as in the old English cases, is in making the facts
fit a particular theory. These problems of the modern law, considered
from a historical standpoint, are treated at length by Mr. Schechter with-
out reaching a definite conclusion.
From the trend of present decisions it can no longer be maintained that
a naked trade mark is property. A business branch of the law must keep
pace with business practice. To confine trade mark law to narrow bounds
and arbitrary and artificial classifications leads to difficulties, contradic-
tions, and manifest injustice. It seems inadequate to answer the conun-
drum, which Mr. Schechter puts, by saying that trade mark law is but a
part of the broader law of unfair trading, unless it be conceded that any
act, which artificially interferes with the normal courze of trade, to the
disadvantage of another, constitutes unfair trading, and that this is a
question of fact in each case. The acceptance of this general principle
appears to be the only theory upon which divergent views can b2 recon-
ciled and courts enabled to keep pace with the trade parasite for the
purpose of adequately protecting business.
A=~N M Rum
Chicago, Illinois.
Recent Developments in International Law. By James Wilford Garner.
Calcutta, Calcutta University Press, 1925. pp. %, 840.
This volume incorporates a course of lectures, substantially as they
-were originally written, delivered by Dr. Garner in November and Decem-
ber 1922, as Tagore Professor of Law in the University of Calcutta for
that year. His selection for that post no doubt may in a measure be
ascribed to the impression made by his treatise entitled "International Law
and the World War," published in 1920, in two volumes. To the reflection
of those who are accustomed to contemplate the "codification" of interna-
tional law with a lightness of heart similar to that with which Louis Na-
poleon declared that he entered upon the Franco-German war of 1870, it
may be appropriate to commend Dr. Garner's prefatory remark, in the
volume now under review, that international law, like the common law of
England and the United States, "has grown up slowly and gradually,
largely by the process of accretion;" that the results are "the culmina-
tion of historical and evolutionary processes," which can be "satisfactorily
studied only by beginning with their origins;" and that much of what has
taken place since the opening of the present century, instead of being in
any true sense of the word a "development," belongs more properly to the
domain of "interpretation" and "application," sometimes reprezenting
"retrogression rather than progress." On the other hand, the reaching of
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a specific agreement, as is now and then done, on rules concerning matters
about which there has been a divergence of opinion among states, involves,
he observes, "the work of codification in the larger sense of the word;"
and notable attempts have been made in recent years to advance in this
direction.
As regards present doctrine and practice, Dr. Garner says that "the
supremacy of international law does not exist in the sense that national
courts may disregard the law of their own state when in their opinion it
is repugnant to the prescriptions of international law;" and, employing
the terminology of certain other writers, the value of which he questions,
he remarks that, in the aspect just mentioned, international law "is still
inter-national and not super-national." Not only do I fully share Dr.
Garner's doubts as to the value of this terminology, but I think it clearly
betrays, on the part of its authors, a want of appreciation of certain ele-
mentary legal principles. The phrase "international law" has to a great
extent superseded the title "law of nations," or, as we often find it in
earlier writers, "laws of nations;" and the specific object of the substitu-
tion was to indicate that this body of law, instead of being a law of
nations, in the sense of emanating and deriving its authority from the leg-
islation and decrees of each nation separately and individually, was "in-
ternational," or, in other words, a law between nations, binding them as
between themselves, individually and collectively, by a superior obliga-
tion, and constituting a standard to which their municipal law must be
made to conform. Of this conception there is the familiar corollary that
all states within the circle of law-governed nations are conclusively pre-
sumed to have accepted that obligation and standard. This is simple and
altogether intelligible. The part national courts may play in the interpre-
tation and application of international law is another matter, National
courts are not the sole nor the final interpreters of international law, nor
are they the designated agencies of foreign intercourse; and if, in dis-
charging their functions, they violate a rule of international law either
freely, by reason of misunderstanding, or under compulsion, by reason of
an act of national legislation, the nation is answerable through its proper
organ. This is an admitted principle so constantly acted upon that the
citation of examples of its observance should be superfluous.
In the course of his discussions Dr. Garner deals, among other things,
with The Hague conventions, maritime warfare and the Declaration of
London; with the interpretation and application of international law in
recent wars, including the "world war," and with the peaceful settlement
of international disputes by means of arbitration and otherwise. He de-
votes to the history of the development of an international court of justice
an entire lecture, concluding with a comprehensive account of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice which was eventually opened at The
Hague in 1922. In describing the so-called convention for the limitation of
the use of force for the collection of contract debts (The Hague 1907),
he inadvertently speaks (pp. 70, 71) of Seflor Drago as a Chilean; he was,
like Calve, an Argentine. But this is not a matter of substance. On the
other hand, one naturally looks for the author's considered opinions on
questions of such profound importance as the professed interpretations
and applications of international law during the "world war;" and it is
interesting to find here the clear and significant statement that, in respect
of the treatment of the property and business enterprises of enemy aliens,
"'the policy of all the belligerents was severe and largely unprecedented"
"p. 311). No less clear and significant is his opinion that, although none
f the belligerents appears to have "intended" that the properties taken
"nto their custody should be "confiscated outright," yet the provision of
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the treaties of peace (the Versailles treaty with Germany, and the trea-
ties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey) that such properties
should be held for the satisfaction of claims "amounted virtually to con-
fiscation," and that "the requirement that the enemy governments should
indemnify their nationals for the losses sustained by the appropriation of
their property for this purpose hardly rendered it less so" (pp. 312-1=).
A writer is to be commended who, thus brushing sophistry aside, candidly
goes to the heart of the matter.
JOHN BASSnMrr Moors
Rye, New York.
Law and Practice of Libel and Slander. By Clement Gatley. London.
Sweet & laxwell, Ltd., 1924, pp. cx-xii, 932.
This book is the latest volume on the subject of defamation. In ar-
rangement, content, and clarity of statement, it is not unlike that of
Odgers, although one would hesitate before saying that it is a better
or even as good a book. Perhaps the chief difference lies in the emphasis
which the two authors have given to the decided cases. The impression
left with the writer after a rather hasty reading of the text, is that it is
more of a statement of rules and results gleaned from the decisions, and
less of an exposition of underlying principles, than is to be found in
Odger's book. In view of the size, and the large number of cases col-
lected, it is impracticable to even attempt, within the compass of a re-
view, to discuss the book in detail. Besides, an appraisal of the work
as a whole based upon isolated parts which, on a hasty reading, appear to
be either meritorious or objectionable, would be of little value.
The author has endeavored not only to state the results of the English
cases, but has included many Colonial and American decisions. In the
preface, the author states that he has carefully gone through the case3
collected in the American Century and Decennial Digests, and has incor-
porated a large number of the more important of them, among which are
several illustrating novel or doubtful points of law. The discussion of
the English cases appears to be e-xhaustive and, in the main, accurate.
But the treatment of the American cases, being more or less incidental, is
in many cases inadequate and in some instances misleading. Thus, in the
discussion of slanderous words actionable per sc because they disparage
a person in his trade, business, office or profession, the author confines him-
self almost wholly to the English cases. After discussing the decision of
the House of Lords in Jones v. Jones' which held that words accusing a
schoolmaster of immoral conduct were not actionable per se, the author
does not mention the- fact that an opposite conclusion was reached by an
American court.2 Likewise, after pointing out that according to the
English decisions prior to the enactment of the Slander of Women Act
in 1891, words imputing unchastity to a woman were not actionable per cc,
the author does not note that a number of American courts held such words
to be actionable per se without the aid of a statute.2 Again, in discussing
whether a municipal corporation may recover for a libel against the cor-
1 [1916, H. L.J 2 A. C. 481.
- Nicholson v. Dillard (1911) 137 Ga. 225, 73 S. E. 382; see (1915) 23
HAnv. L. REv. 713.
3 Perhaps the majority American view is that such words are not action-
able per se. Pollard v. Lyon (1875) 91 U. S. 225. But several American
courts have declared words of this character to be actionable per -c in
the absence of a statute. Cutshing v. Hcdermana (1902) 117 Iowa, 637, 91
N. W. 940; Barnett v. Ward (1880) 36 Ohio St. 107; Battle -. Tyson
(1906) 77 Neb. 563, 110 N. W. 299.
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poration, the author discusses the English cases, but makes no, mention of
the recent and, perhaps, the leading American decision upon this point.
4
In the chapter on Absolute Privilege, the text is confined largely to
the English decisions, but in a footnote the American rule is stated as
follows:
"In America the rule as to the privilege of statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings is subject to the qualification as to parties,
counsel, and witnesses that their statement be pertinent and material to
the subject-matter of the inquiry, but the Courts take a very liberal view
of what is pertinent and material."
The above is a correct statement of the majority5 American view if the
author means that parties, counsel and witnesses enjoy an absolute privi-
lege only when the statement is pertinent and material to the subject-
matter of the inquiry. But the statement is open to criticism in that it may
convey the impression that if the statement is not pertinent and material,
there is no privilege at all. Certainly this is not so according to some
American decisions. The rule, as laid down in many American cases, is
that if the statement is pertinent, it is absolutely privileged; if the state-
ment is not pertinent, then there is only a conditional privilege.0
It is disappointing to find that the author has accepted the decision in
Smith v. Streatfield and others7 without quaere or comment. The facts in
that case were that A, who was conditionally privileged to publish to cer-
tain persons defamatory matter concerning B, employed X, a printer, to
print the defamatory matter for distribution. In an action against A
and X for libel, the defense of privilege was interposed. It appeared that
A was actuated by malice, but that X, the printer, acted in good faith.
The court conceded that X would not have been, liable had it appeared that
A acted in good faith, but the court held that the malice of A, although
unknown to X, defeated the privilege both for A and X, and that they were
joint tort feasors and jointly liable. This conclusion is predicated upon
the assumption that there was but one privilege, like a single shield which,
having been destroyed because of A's malice, necessarily left X exposed to
liability. Certainly the result is shocking. Had the court regarded the
privilege of A and X as separate privileges, obviously a different con-
clusion as to X might have been reached. The occasion being a privi-
leged one, and X having no reason to suppose that A was actuated by
malice, it would seem that he was justified in printing and distributing
the pamphlets. If X, in answer to an inquiry about B, had made defama-
tory statements concerning B, X would have been protected if he had acted
in good faith, and his privilege would not have been defeated because it
subsequently appeared that the one making the inquiry had no real inter-
est in the subject matter, but was actuated solely by curiosity.8 If in this
case X is not bound to ascertain the motive of the one making the inquiry,
4 City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. (1923) 307 Ill. 595, 139 N. E. 86.
5 Apparently the Kentucky and Maryland courts have followed the
English decisions and accorded an absolute privilege to witnesses, counsel
and litigants. See Sebree v. Thompson (1907) 126 Ky. 223, 103 S. W. 374;
Yancey v. Commonwealth (1909) 135 Ky. 207, 122 S. W. 123; Hunckol v.
Voneiff (1888) 69 Md. 179, 17 Atl. 1056.
6 See Myers v. Hodges (1907) 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357, for an excellent
discussion of the majority American rule as well as an exhaustive collec-
tion of the cases. See also Dayton v. Drumheller (1919) 82 Idaho, 283,
182 Pac. 102.
7 [1913] 3 K. B. 764.
8 In London Association v. Greenlands [1916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 15, Lord
Atkinson made the following observation (p. 35): "It was decided as long
ago, I think, as Bromage v. Prosser (4 B. & C. 247), and many times since,
that if one person makes an inquiry of another touching the position or
character of a third, and the person inquired of makes a reply which he
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it is difficult to see why the printer in Smith v. Strcatfield and othcra was
bound to determine the motive of the one who employed him to make a
communication on an occasion which was obviously privileged. Where
the agency employed to transmit the communication is a telegraph com-
pany, there are decisions in America which support the conclusion that
the telegraph company is protected if the sender of the message is appar-
ently privileged and the operator acted in good faith in transmitting it.9
While a telegraph company may be given greater protection than other
agents,10 it is difficult to justify the distinction. In this connection, it
should be noted, that the author does not discuss the American cases which
accord to the telegraph company a privilege under the above mentioned
circumstances.
Among the statements said to be actionable per so because they impute
to the plaintiff certain diseases, the author, in addition to venereal disorders,
leprosy and the plague, adds scarlet fever. This is rather startling, in
view of the fact that neither Odgers nor Fraser thought that to accuse
one of having scarlet fever was slander per se. Furthermore, the authori-
ties cited in support of the statement do not support the text. If scarlet
fever is to be added to the list, there would be no justification for excluding
small-pox, the imputation of which both Odgers and Fraser declare is not
actionable per so.
While one might point to numerous passages in the book which appear
to be inadequate or questionable, its good qualities far outweigh the bad,
and in that it brings together many important English cases decided since
other leading texts on the subject were published, it will undoubtedly prove
to be of value to the profession.
YOUNG B. SMITH
Columbia Law School.
bona fide believes to be true, and also bona fide believes that the inquirer
desires the information, not merely to gratify idle curiosity, but for some
purpose in which he, the inquirer, has a legitimate interest of his own, the
occasion upon which the answer is communicated to him is a privilegcd
occasion. This will be so, I think, whether either of the beliefs so formel
by the person inquired of be reasonable or not-Clarke v. J.ol!yzCz!.e (1877)
L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 237-and also whether the inquirer, in fact, dccd the
information for the purpose mentioned. It will be cz.ffczc t if tile other
person honestly believes he does so req ire it: Waller v. Loch (1881) L. R.
7 Q. B. Div. 619." (Italics the writer's.) See also dictum in Smuderli- v.
Bradstreet (1871) 46 N. Y. 188.
9 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman (1906, C. C. A. 5th) 149 Fed. 367;
Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1900, C. C. D. Minn.) 104 Fed. 628; Peter-
son v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1896) 65 Blinn. 18, 67 N. W. 646; (1898) 72
Iinn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022; (1899) 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 935 (cemble);
Paton v. Great Northwestern Telegraph Co. (1919) 141 Blinn. 430, 170 N.
W. 511. See discussion of this question in article by present writer (1920)
20 COL. L. REv. 30, 369.
10 See Smith, Liability of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a
Defamatory Message (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 369 at 383 et ceq.
